This question is kinda complimentary to "Share credentials between native app and web site", as we aim to share secrets in the opposite direction.
TL;TR: how can we securely share the user's authentication/authorization state from a Web Browser app to a Native Desktop app, so the same user doesn't have to authenticate additionally in the Native app?
TS;WM: We are working on the following architecture: a Web Application (with some HTML front-end UI running inside a Web Browser of user's choice), a Native Desktop Application (implementing a custom protocol handler), a Web API and an OAuth2 service, as on the picture.
Initially, the user is authenticated/authorized in the Web Browser app against the OAuth2 service, using the Authorization Code Grant flow.
Then, the Web Browser content can do one-way talking to the Native app, when the user clicks on our custom protocol-based hyperlinks. Basically, it's done to establish a secure bidirectional back-end communication channel between the two, conducted via the Web API.
We believe that, before acting upon any requests received via a custom protocol link from the Web Browser app, the Native app should first authenticate the user (who is supposed to be the same person using this particular desktop session). We think the Native app should as well use the Authorization Code flow (with PKCE) to obtain an access token for the Web API. Then it should be able to securely verify the origin and integrity of the custom protocol data, using the same Web API.
However, it can be a hindering experience for the user to have to authenticate twice, first in the Web Browser and second in the Native app, both running side-by-side.
Thus, the question: is there a way to pass an OAuth2 access token (or any other authorization bearer) from the Web Browser app to the Native app securely, without compromising the client-side security of this architecture? I.e., so the Native app could call the Web API using the identity from the Web Browser, without having to authenticate the same user first?
Personally, I can't see how we can safely avoid that additional authentication flow. Communication via a custom app protocol is insecure by default, as typically it's just a command line argument the Native app is invoked with. Unlike a TLS channel, it can be intercepted, impersonated etc. We could possibly encrypt the custom protocol data. Still, whatever calls the Native app would have to make to decrypt it (either to a client OS API or some unprotected calls to the Web API), a bad actor/malware might be able to replicate those, too.
Am I missing something? Is there a secure platform-specific solution? The Native Desktop app is an Electron app and is designed to be cross-platform. Most of our users will run this on Windows using any supported browser (including even IE11), but ActiveX or hacking into a running web browser instance is out of question.
The best solution : Single Sign On (SSO) using Custom URL Scheme
When I was checking your question, I remembered the Zoom app that I am using in my office. How it works ?
I have my Gmail account linked to a Zoom account (this is account linkage, which is outside the scope of implementation). When I open Zoom app, I can choose the option to login with Gmail. This opens my browser and take me to Gmail. If I am logged in to Gmail, I am redirected back to a page that asking me to launch Zoom app. How this app launch happen ? The application register a custom URL scheme when app get installed and the final redirect in browser targets this URL. And this URL passes a temporary secret, which Zoom application uses to obtain OAuth tokens. And token obtaining is done independent of the browser, a direct call with SSL to token endpoint of OAuth server.
Well this is Authorization code flow for native applications. And this is how Mobile applications use OAuth. Your main issue, not allowing user to re-login is solved. This is SSO in action.
There is a specification which define best practices around this mechanism. I welcome you to go through RFC8252 - OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps.
Challenge
You need to implement OS specific native code for each application distribution. Windows, Mac and Linux have different implementation support for custom URL scheme.
Advice
PKCE is mandatory (in IETF words SHOULD) for all OAuth grant types. There is this ongoing draft which talks about this. So include PKCE for your implementation too.
With PKCE, the redirect/callback response is protected from stealing. Even some other application intercept the callback, the token request cannot be recreated as the PKCE code_verifer is there.
Also, do not use a custom solution like passing secret through another channel. This will make things complicated when it comes to maintenance. Since this flow already exists in OAuth, you can benefit with libraries and guidance.
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Update : Protecting Token Request
While the custom URL scheme solves the problem of launching the native application, protecting token request can be challenging. There are several options to consider.
- Bind native application launch with a secret shared from browser
When browser based client launch the native client, it can invoke a custom API to generate a secret. This secret acts like a one time password (OTP). User has to enter this value in native app before it obtain tokens. This is a customization on top of Authorization code flow.
- Dynamic client registration & Dynamic client authentication
Embedding secrets into public clients is discouraged by OAuth specification. But as question owner points out, some malicious app may register itself to receive custom URL response and obtain tokens. In such occasion, PKCE can provide an added layer of security.
But still in an extreme case, if malicious app registers the URL plus use PKCE as the original application, then there can be potential threats.
One option is to allow dynamic client registration at the first time of application launch. Here, installer/distribution can include a secret that used along with DCR.
Also, it is possible to use dynamic client authentication through a dedicated service. Here, the application's token request contains a temporary token issued by a custom service. Custom service obtain a challenge from native application. This may be done through totp or a cryptographic binding based on an embedded secret. Also it is possible to utilize OTP (as mentioned in first note) issued through browser, which needs to be copy pasted manually by end user. Once validated, this service issue a token which correlate to the secret. In the token request, native client sends this token along with call back values. This way we reduce threat vectors even though we increase implementation complexity.
Summary
Use custom URL scheme to launch the native application
Browser app generate a temporary secret shared with a custom service
At native app launch, user should copy the secret to native app UI
Native app exchange this secret with custom service to obtain a token
This second token combined with call back authorization code (issued through custom url scheme) is used to authenticate to token endpoint
Above can be considered as a dynamic client authentication
Value exposed to user can be a hashed secret, hence original value is never exposed to end user or another client
DCR is also an option but embedded secrets are discouraged in OAuth world
As you mentioned, using a custom protocol handler is not a safe way to pass secrets, since another app may handle your protocol and intercept that secret.
If you are imposing a strict constraint that the communication channel between the native app and the web app is initiated from the web app, and that the native app has not previously established a secure channel (e.g. shared secret which could encrypt other secrets), then it is not possible to safely transmit a secret to the native app.
Imagine if this were possible, then PKCE would be redundant in an OAuth 2.0 Code Flow, since the server could have safely transmitted the access token in response to the authorization request, instead of requiring the code_verifier to be provided with the grant when obtaining the access token.
Just got the following idea. It's simple and while it doesn't allow to fully automate the setup of a secure channel between Web Browser app and the Native app, it may significantly improve the user experience.
We can use Time-based One-Time Password algorithm (TOTP). In a way, it's similar to how we pair a Bluetooth keyboard to a computer or a phone.
The Web Browser app (where the user is already authenticated) could display a time-based code to the user, and the Native app should ask the user to enter that code as a confirmation. It would then use the code to authenticate against the Web API. That should be enough to establish a back-end channel between the two. The life time of the channel should be limited to that of the session within the Web Browser app. This approach might even eliminate the need for a custom protocol communication in the first place.
Still open to other ideas.
You could try driving the synchronization the other way:
Once the user is authenticated into the web app, launch the native app from the web app via the custom URL scheme.
If the native app is not authenticated, connect securely to the backend over HTTPS, create a record for the native app, retrieve a one time token associated with that record and then launch the web app in the user's browser with the token as a URL parameter.
Since the user is authenticated in the browser, when the server sees the token it can bind the native app's record with the user account.
Have the native app poll (or use some other realtime channel like push notifications or a TCP connection) the server to see if the token has been bound to a user account: once that happens you can pass a persistent auth token that the native app can store.
Did you think about using LDAP or Active Directory?
Also OAuth2 could be combined, here are a related question:
- Oauth service for LDAP authentication
- Oauth 2 token for Active Directory accounts
SSO should be easier then too, furthermore access-rights could be managed centralized.
Concerning general security considerations you could work with two servers and redirect form the one for the web-application to the other one after successful access check. That 2nd server can be protected so far that a redirect is required from the 1st server and an access check could be made independent again but without need to login another time, might be important to mention here the proposed usage of Oracle Access Manager in one linked answer for perimeter authentication.
This scenario with two servers could be also hidden by using a proxy-server in the frontend and making the redirects hidden, like that data-transfer between servers would be easier and secure too.
The important point about my proposition is that access to the 2nd server is just not granted if anything is wrong and the data are still protected.
I read here some comments concerning 2FA and some other ideas like tokens, surely those things increase security and it would be good to implement them.
If you like the general idea, I'm willing to spend still some time on the details. Some questions might be helpful for me ;-)
EDIT:
Technically the design in detail might depend on the used external authentication provider like Oracle Access Manager or something else. So if the solution in general sounds reasonable for you it would be useful to elaborate some parameters for the choice of a external authentication provider, i.e. price, open-source, features, etc.
Nevertheless the general procedure then is that the provider issues a token and this token serves for authentication. The token is for unique one-time usage, the second link I posted above has some answers that explain token-usage very well related to security and OAuth.
EDIT2
The Difference between an own OAuth2 / OIDC server and a LDAP/AD server is that you need to program everything by yourself and can't use ready solutions. Nevertheless you're independent and if everything is programmed well perhaps even a bit more secure as your solution is not public available and therefore harder to hack - potential vulnerabilities just can't be known by others. Also you're more independent, never have to wait for updates and are free to change whatever you want at any time. Considering that several software-servers are involved and perhaps even hardware-servers the own solution might be limited scale-able, but that can't be know from outside and depends on your company / team. Your code base probably is slimmer than full-blown solutions as you've only to consider your own solution and requirements.
The weak point in your solution might be that you have to program interfaces to several things that exist ready for business-frameworks. Also it might be hard to consider every single point in a small team, large companies could have more overview and capacity to tackle every potential issue.
I am developing a web system in php using the laravel framework, I arrived at the part of authentication of users, where it is not allowed the type of user x access to page y. What is the best way to do this with laravel? I thought about creating a session and saving the id of the user, so every time he accesses a certain controller I check if he has access to the id or not. so I had some doubts.
Is this a good way to perform this authentication?
Is this really safe?
is there any way for the client to change my session?
What would be a better method for authenticating user access?
Laravel provides a very good authentication system out of the box. Even though Hacking is inevitable it provides very good protection and since Laravel is pretty popular framework you don't have to worry about the security part. if there is any security bug, patches will be available almost immediately.
And your second concern can a client can change the session ? the answer is NO, if you code it properly. session resides in the server unlike cookies, so there is no direct way for a user to change the session. if you follow good coding practices you are good to go.
And how do you limit userA from accessing pageB. This is a pretty common feature needed in almost all the applications. As of now Laravel does not provide an out of the box solution for this. but this is pretty simple, you can add a role column to the users table, and check whether user have appropriate permission in each page. Laravel keeps the user object in the session, and it is avilable via the auth() helper or Auth Facade. if you want a little sophisticated solution there is a package out there [entrust][1]. it seems a good choice.
You may want to read about
Authorization
Csrf Protection
Authentication
I hope I have addressed all your concerns
Laravel provides a simple way to authorize action thats purpose built for what you need:
https://laravel.com/docs/5.5/authorization
Laravel Socialite has a "stateless" mode which disables storing anything to session. From a read of the source code it doesn't do anything different instead -- it just doesn't store or retrieve these values.
As part of this, it assumes for example that the OAuth state is always valid.
Checking this is one of the things which the Twitter sign-in documentation, for example, tells us to do.
So I'm wondering what sort of security implications using the stateless mode of Socialite could have.
If it's anything serious, what sort of workarounds would there be, for an application running as a stateless API? I could store things in its Redis store, but I'm not sure how I'd tie any bit of information to the current user. By reimplementing what Socialite does I could for example store the state in the cache, keyed by some hash of the user's IP and browser fingerprint. But this seems very messy.
This answer from #iandayman shows what could go wrong without OAuth state parameter in a login flow: https://stackoverflow.com/a/35988614
I recently noticed the addition of a "Session" object in Parse dashboard. Now, from what I understand, a session uniquely identifies a user to the server. So why would we need such a Session? For the session token? We already have a currentInstallation... so I don't really see the point. Can someone explain and provide a scenario where I would use the "Session" object. Right now they just annoy me by their presence because they take up potential space on the Parse server and I would like to go delete them all but want to make sure that isn't stupid.
The sessions are used by parse to deal with the users (is the user logged?, on which devices?, etc.), and are available as a class as you may want to manipulate them. By deleting the sessions you would automatically logout all your users, so it's a pretty bad idea.
You don't have to use or touch anything about this class, but here are few examples of why it can be useful:
[...] If a user contacts you about his or her account being compromised in your app, you can use the Data Browser, REST API, or Cloud Code to forcefully revoke user sessions using the Master Key. These new APIs also allow you build a “session manager” UI screen where your app’s users can see a list of all devices they’ve logged in with, and optionally log out of other devices. [...]
You can read more about the Sessions on their blog post.
I'm a little new to this and please bear with me if I ask dumb questions.
As what I know, session is something saved at server (either in file or in database), and client access it via sessionid saved in cookie. To keep user login information, we can simply put a 'logged_in' column and an 'expired' column in session file or session table.
As far as I know, Oauth2.0 is designed for third party client to access the server. The whole process is controlled by an access_token, which is quite similar to sessionid (at least from my knowledge).
So, here's my question, is it possible to use Oauth2.0 to completely replace session? I.e., even people are using the website designed by me (NOT third party website) to access my own server? So that I have a unified authorization framework for user accesses both from my own website and any thrid party website.
Is there any pros&cons of using session & oauth 2.0?
Lastly, how about mobile app? I know for third party mobile app, they normally use oauth to access the server (many websites provides oauth api). How about if I am going to write my own app for my own server (NOT third party)? Does Oauth 2.0 apply here too?
To summarize, my question is actually is, is Oauth 2.0 universal that can be used in all kinds of user authorization control situations from all kinds of devices?
Thank you very much.
Though both are short-living entities, session IDs and OAuth tokens are fundamentally different and used for distinct scenarios. A session is used to identify a user of a web application, thus related to the end user. An OAuth token is used to grant access to a third-party service to access a limited set of protected user resources (e.g. read user contact information or send a mail from the user account). Though the token refers to the granter (i.e. end user authorized the grant), the token related more to the third-party application.
To give you an analogous example: imagine that you have a safe at your bank (i.e. your protected resource). The session is your id for the bank: give it to someone else and he will be you, he can get everything from your safe. On the other hand, a token is a limited authorization to someone else to your safe: e.g. your approval that he can get 10$ from your safe while a security guard is watching.
As a summary, sessions and tokens are not interchangable.