Update: this question is specifically about protecting (encipher / obfuscate) the content client side vs. doing it before transmission from the server. What are the pros / cons on going in an approach like itune's one - in which the files aren't ciphered / obfuscated before transmission.
As I added in my note in the original question, there are contracts in place that we need to comply to (as its the case for most services that implement drm). We push for drm free, and most content providers deals are on it, but that doesn't free us of obligations already in place.
I recently read some information regarding how itunes / fairplay approaches drm, and didn't expect to see the server actually serves the files without any protection.
The quote in this answer seems to capture the spirit of the issue.
The goal should simply be to "keep
honest people honest". If we go
further than this, only two things
happen:
We fight a battle we cannot win. Those who want to cheat will succeed.
We hurt the honest users of our product by making it more difficult to use.
I don't see any impact on the honest users in here, files would be tied to the user - regardless if this happens client or server side. This does gives another chance to those in 1.
An extra bit of info: client environment is adobe air, multiple content types involved (music, video, flash apps, images).
So, is it reasonable to do like itune's fairplay and protect the media client side.
Note: I think unbreakable DRM is an unsolvable problem and as most looking for an answer to this, the need for it relates to it already being in a contract with content providers ... in the likes of reasonable best effort.
I think you might be missing something here. Users hate, hate, hate, HATE DRM. That's why no media company ever gets any traction when they try to use it.
The kicker here is that the contract says "reasonable best effort", and I haven't the faintest idea of what that will mean in a court of law.
What you want to do is make your client happy with the DRM you put on. I don't know what your client thinks DRM is, can do, costs in resources, or if your client is actually aware that DRM can be really annoying. You would have to answer that. You can try to educate the client, but that could be seen as trying to explain away substandard work.
If the client is not happy, the next fallback position is to get paid without litigation, and for that to happen, the contract has to be reasonably clear. Unfortunately, "reasonable best effort" isn't clear, so you might wind up in court. You may be able to renegotiate parts of the contract in the client's favor, or you may not.
If all else fails, you hope to win the court case.
I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. I do see this as more of a question of expectations and possible legal interpretation than a technical question. I don't think we can help you here. You should consult with a lawyer who specializes in this sort of thing, and I don't even know what speciality to recommend. If you're in the US, call your local Bar Association and ask for a referral.
I don't see any impact on the honest users in here, files would be tied to the user - regardless if this happens client or server side. This does gives another chance to those in 1.
Files being tied to the user requires some method of verifying that there is a user. What happens when your verification server goes down (or is discontinued, as Wal-Mart did)?
There is no level of DRM that doesn't affect at least some "honest users".
Data can be copied
As long as client hardware, standalone, can not distinguish between a "good" and a "bad" copy, you will end up limiting all general copies, and copy mechanisms. Most DRM companies deal with this fact by a telling me how much this technology sets me free. Almost as if people would start to believe when they hear the same thing often enough...
Code can't be protected on the client. Protecting code on the server is a largely solved problem. Protecting code on the client isn't. All current approaches come with stingy restrictions.
Impact works in subtle ways. At the very least, you have the additional cost of implementing client-side-DRM (and all follow-up cost, including the horde of "DMCA"-shouting lawyer gorillas) It is hard to prove that you will offset this cost with the increased revenue.
It's not just about code and crypto. Once you implement client-side DRM, you unleash a chain of events in Marketing, Public Relations and Legal. A long as they don't stop to alienate users, you don't need to bother.
To answer the question "is it reasonable", you have to be clear when you use the word "protect" what you're trying to protect against...
For example, are you trying to:
authorized users from using their downloaded content via your app under certain circumstances (e.g. rental period expiry, copied to a different computer, etc)?
authorized users from using their downloaded content via any app under certain circumstances (e.g. rental period expiry, copied to a different computer, etc)?
unauthorized users from using content received from authorized users via your app?
unauthorized users from using content received from authorized users via any app?
known users from accessing unpurchased/unauthorized content from the media library on your server via your app?
known users from accessing unpurchased/unauthorized content from the media library on your server via any app?
unknown users from accessing the media library on your server via your app?
unknown users from accessing the media library on your server via any app?
etc...
"Any app" in the above can include things like:
other player programs designed to interoperate/cooperate with your site (e.g. for flickr)
programs designed to convert content to other formats, possibly non-DRM formats
hostile programs designed to
From the article you linked, you can start to see some of the possible limitations of applying the DRM client-side...
The third, originally used in PyMusique, a Linux client for the iTunes Store, pretends to be iTunes. It requested songs from Apple's servers and then downloaded the purchased songs without locking them, as iTunes would.
The fourth, used in FairKeys, also pretends to be iTunes; it requests a user's keys from Apple's servers and then uses these keys to unlock existing purchased songs.
Neither of these approaches required breaking the DRM being applied, or even hacking any of the products involved; they could be done simply by passively observing the protocols involved, and then imitating them.
So the question becomes: are you trying to protect against these kinds of attack?
If yes, then client-applied DRM is not reasonable.
If no (for example, you're only concerned about people using your app, like Apple/iTunes does), then it might be.
(repeat this process for every situation you can think of. If the adig nswer is always either "client-applied DRM will protect me" or "I'm not trying to protect against this situation", then using client-applied DRM is resonable.)
Note that for the last four of my examples, while DRM would protect against those situations as a side-effect, it's not the best place to enforce those restrictions. Those kinds of restrictions are best applied on the server in the login/authorization process.
If the server serves the content without protection, it's because the encryption is per-client.
That being said, wireshark will foil your best-laid plans.
Encryption alone is usually just as good as sending a boolean telling you if you're allowed to use the content, since the bypass is usually just changing the input/output to one encryption API call...
You want to use heavy binary obfuscation on the client side if you want the protection to literally hold for more than 5 minutes. Using decryption on the client side, make sure the data cannot be replayed and that the only way to bypass the system is to reverse engineer the entire binary protection scheme. Properly done, this will stop all the kids.
On another note, if this is a product to be run on an operating system, don't use processor specific or operating system specific anomalies such as the Windows PEB/TEB/syscalls and processor bugs, those will only make the program even less portable than DRM already is.
Oh and to answer the question title: No. It's a waste of time and money, and will make your product not work on my hardened Linux system.
Related
I was cruising around the browser reading articles about MItB and still can't find a technical way of getting rid of an MItB infection. hence, I was wondering: Is there is such a way to delete an MItB attack technically? If you were to click an infected link on a computer or mobile through a browser, in which triggered the MItB and infects your web browser, can you destroy the vulnerability by reinstalling the browser, whether in your phone or computer? More importantly, does MItB make any difference in computer and phones?
Man in the browser (mitb) is a nasty attack because "traditional" security mechanisms are not very effective against it. This is a classic example of a Trojan because the "enemy" is behind your city wall (security layers). Encryption won't help because the data the attacker is accessing is already decrypted. So the attacker has the chance to inject scripts, modify transactions, collect personal data, etc., without the user's knowledge. From the user's POV, everything is fine. They won't notice anything is wrong until the damage is done.
Your idea of reinstalling the browser is unlikely to work. The Trojan can survive the reinstall because it is not part of the browser itself. It is either an extension (or "browser helper object"), malicious JavaScript, or an external program which messes with the browser's API calls.
Also, active detection and mitigation by antivirus and other anti-malware software is not very successful. AV will detect some Trojans, but the detection rates are low. Trojans are, by design, engineered to avoid detection.
One approach you will often hear mentioned is 2-factor authentication or out-of-band transaction verification. The most common is to send a code to the user's phone or e-mail. In some systems, this code will also include information about the specific transaction which is being verified. The idea here is that the phone or other communication channel will not be impacted by the Trojan, so it should be safe from interference. But honestly I don't really think this is 100% safe. You will still have users who ignore any warning signs in the message and just blindly continue typing in the verification code into their browser because they are 1) ignorant 2) in a hurry, or both. And even then, you are assuming the the out-of-band communication mechanism has not been compromised. That's a big assumption. If you're wrong, then it will be completely ineffective.
Another approach is to sidestep the problem and look at the user's behavior from the server side. If you can establish a model of their "normal" behavior, then there is a reasonable chance of identifying suspicious activity. What is suspicious activity? It can be anything like a sudden increase in large transactions, changing IP address in the middle of a session, and navigating between pages in an "unnatural" way. When this type of behavior is detected, you can notify the user or take steps like locking their account or just rejecting a transaction. Of course, this will be limited to a specific service (e.g. the user's bank) and there is always a chance of false positives. It doesn't address the root of the problem, because the user's platform will still be infected.
The defense right now is not detection but prevention. Stop the Trojan from getting in. The most obvious one. Don't download and open or execute anything unless you trust the source 100%. That means the source should have E2E encryption and a trustworthy SSL (TLS) cert, preferably extended validation (EV).
Also make sure your OS is up to date with the latest security patches. Finally, don't use browsers with known vulnerabilities. And even then, avoid suspicious browser plugins/extensions.
I want to keep no-good scrapers (aka. bad bots that by defintition ignores robots.txt) that steal content and consume bandwidth off my site. At the same time, I do not want to interfere with the user experience of legitimate human users, or stop well-behaved bots (such as Googlebot) from indexing the site.
The standard method for dealing with this has already been described here: Tactics for dealing with misbehaving robots. However, the solution presented and upvoted in that thread is not what I am looking for.
Some bad bots connect through tor or botnets, which means that their IP address is ephemeral and may well belong to a human being using a compromised computer.
I've therefore been thinking about how to improve the industry standard method by letting the "false positives" (i.e. humans) that has their IP blacklisted get access to my website again. One idea is to stop blocking these IPs outright, and instead asking them to pass a CAPTCHA before being allowed access. While I consider CAPTCHA to be a PITA for legitimate users, vetting suspected bad bots with a CAPTCHA seems to be a better solution than blocking access for these IPs completely. By tracking the session of users that completes the CAPTCHA, I should be able to determine whether they are human (and should have their IP removed from the blacklist), or robots smart enough to solve a CAPTCHA, placing them on an even blacker list.
However, before I go ahead and implement this idea, I want to ask the good people here if they foresee any problems or weaknesses (I am already aware that some CAPTCHAs has been broken - but I think that I shall be able to handle that).
The question I believe is whether or not there are foreseeable problems with captcha. Before I dive into that, I also want to address the point of how you plan on catching bots to challenge them with a captcha. TOR and proxy nodes change regularly so that IP list will need to be constantly updated. You can use Maxmind for a decent list of proxy addresses as your baseline. You can also find services that update the addresses of all the TOR nodes. But not all bad bots come from those two vectors, so you need find other ways of catching bots. If you add in rate limiting and spam lists then you should get to over 50% of the bad bots. Other tactics really have to be custom built around your site.
Now to talk about problems with Captchas. First, there are services like http://deathbycaptcha.com/. I dont know if I need to elaborate on that one, but it kind of renders your approach useless. Many of the other ways people get around Captcha's are using OCR software. The better the Captcha is at beating OCR, the harder it is going to be on your users. Also, many Captcha systems use client side cookies that someone can solve once and then upload to all their bots.
Most famous I think is Karl Groves's list of 28 ways to beat Captcha. http://www.karlgroves.com/2013/02/09/list-of-resources-breaking-captcha/
For full disclosure, I am a cofounder of Distil Networks, a SaaS solution to block bots. I often pitch our software as a more sophisticated system than simply using captcha and building it yourself so my opinion of the effectivity of your solution is biased.
Is it possible to create a script that is executed outside of the server,
or with a browser add-on for example it automatically fills in form values, then submits the form all ready to be parsed by the server ? this way in three minutes a billion fake accounts could get registered very easily, imagine facebook which does not use any visible to the human captcha, a browser add on that performs the form submission and inserts the vals retrieved from a local database for new emails to be associated as that is a check - no duplicate emails, can thousands and thousands of fake accounts be created each day accross the globe?
What is the best method to prevent fake accounts? Even imagining the scenario of a rotating ips center with human beings registering just to choke the databases, achieving 30-50 million accounts in a year. Thanks
This is probably better on the Security.Stackexchange.com website, but...
According to the OWASP Guide to Authentication, CAPTCHAs are actually a bad thing. Not only do they not work, induce additional headaches, but in come cases (per OWASP) they are illegal.
CAPTCHA
CAPTCHA (Completely automated Turing Tests To Tell Humans and Computers Apart) are illegal in any jurisdiction that prohibits
discrimination against disabled citizens. This is essentially the
entire world. Although CAPTCHAs seem useful, they are in fact, trivial
to break using any of the following methods:
• Optical Character Recognition. Most common CAPTCHAs are solvable using specialist
CAPTCHA breaking OCR software.
• Break a test, get free access to foo,> where foo is a desirable resource
• Pay someone to solve the CAPTCHAs.
The current rate at the time of writing is $12 per 500 tests.
Therefore implementing CAPTCHAs in your software is most likely to be
illegal in at least a few countries, and worse - completely
ineffective.
Other methods are commonly used.
The most common, probably, is the e-mail verification process. You sign up, they send you an email, and only when you confirm it is the account activated and accessible.
There are also several interesting alternatives to CAPTCHA that perform the same function, but in a manner that's (arguably, in some cases) less difficult.
More difficult may be to track form submissions from a single IP address, and block obvious attacks. But that can be spoofed and bypassed.
Another technique to use JavaScript to time the amount of time the user spent on the web page before submitting. Most bots will submit things almost instantly (if they even run the JavaScript at all), so checking that a second or 2 has elapsed since the page rendered can detect bots. but bots can be crafted to fool this as well
The Honeypot technique can also help to detect such form submissions. There's a nice example of implementation here.
This page also talks about a Form Token method. The Form Token is one I'd never heard of until just now in this context. It looks similar to an anti-csrf token in concept.
All told, your best defense, as with anything security related, is a layered approach, using more than one defense. The idea is to make it more difficult than average, so that your attacker gives up ad tries a different site. This won't block persistent attackers, but it will scale down on the drive-by attacks.
To answer your original question, it all depends on what preventative measures the website developer took to prevent people from automatic account creation.
Any competent developer would address this in the requirements gathering phase, and plan for it. But there are plenty of websites out there coded by incompetent developers/teams, even among big-name companies that should know better.
This is possible using simple scripts, which may or may not use browser extension (for example scripts written in Perl or shell scripts using wget/curl).
Most websites rely on tracking the number of requests received from a particular browser/IP before they enable CAPTCHA.
This information can be tracked on the server side with a finite expiry time, or in case of clients using multiple IPs (for example users on DHCP connection), this information can be tracked using cookies.
Yes. It is very easy to automate form submissions, for instance using wget or curl. This is exactly why CAPTCHAs exist, to make it difficult to automate form submissions.
Verification e-mails are also helpful, although it'd be fairly straightforward to automate opening them and clicking on the verification links. They do provide protection if you're vigilant about blocking spammy e-mail domains (e.g. hotmail.com).
I am writing a WP7 app and would like to include features to share highscore data using Amazon's AWS as storage service.
As far as I understand WP7 XAP files are (currently) safely encrypted and no known jailbreak for the phone exists. However, given that such a 'safe' encryption can be temporary, I would like to understand if/how this violates best practice.
AWS' dynamoDB uses temporary access tokens that can be generated using given account data and are valid for 36 hours the tokens must be verified using a signature with any request.
I am considering that all access data will be stored in the XAP file, which will also generate the temporary access token and signature. The information will be passed via https requests between the phone and AWS.
I was trying to work out alternative processes including passing the generation of the temporary token calculation to an external webservice, however I cannot think of a way to protect this data which would not be similarly compromised if the XAP file was accessible.
Am I missing the best practice approach completely or am I just overly cautious?
Thanks.
You won't ever be able to prevent users from sending false scores, pretty much for the same reason as unofficial cheating apps exist for every popular game. The best you can do is making it harder.
With a simple approach, the client sends the score directly to the server, without any kind of encryption. Someone can cheat just by running the app on the emulator and capturing the outgoing packets, then opening the same URL on his desktop browser. Estimated time: less than 10 minutes, and it can be done by anyone who knows that he can download XAPs directly from the marketplace, remove the manifest, and deploy it on the emulator.
Then you can add an encryption key on the client. Now someone has to know C# and Reflector to extract it, but it's still easy for someone having those skills.
Next level, you can add an encryption key AND obfuscate the assembly. Knowledge of CIL and Relector are required to extract the key. It'll take 30 minutes to an hour to a highly skilled developper to extract the key, and many hours for most developpers.
Finally, you can add multiple steps to confuse even more the intruder (for instance, downloading a temporary token from a server and using it somehow in the score sending process). Also, you can design the scoring system in a way that some scores are illegal (dumb example: if the minimal scoring action earns 2 points, then if someone sends an odd number as a score you know he's cheating. This one is easy to figure out, but you can make much more complex rules).
In any way, keep in mind that your system will always be vulnerable, it's only a matter of how much time it will take to the attacker to break through it. If it takes many hours or days to a highly skilled developer, then unless you're offering some worthy prize to the best player, you can safely assume that nobody will bother doing that.
I'm interested in how you would approach implementing a BitTorrent-like social network. It might have a central server, but it must be able to run in a peer-to-peer manner, without communication to it:
If a whole region's network is disconnected from the internet, it should be able to pass updates from users inside the region to each other
However, if some computer gets the posts from the central server, it should be able to pass them around.
There is some reasonable level of identification; some computers might be dissipating incomplete/incorrect posts or performing DOS attacks. It should be able to describe some information as coming from more trusted computers and some from less trusted.
It should be able to theoretically use any computer as a server, however, optimizing dynamically the network so that typically only fast computers with ample internet work as seeders.
The network should be able to scale to hundreds of millions of users; however, each particular person is interested in less than a thousand feeds.
It should include some Tor-like privacy features.
Purely theoretical question, though inspired by recent events :) I do hope somebody implements it.
Interesting question. With the use of already existing tor, p2p, darknet features and by using some public/private key infrastructure, you possibly could come up with some great things. It would be nice to see something like this in action. However I see a major problem. Not by some people using it for file sharing, BUT by flooding the network with useless information. I therefore would suggest using a twitter like approach where you can ban and subscribe to certain people and start with a very reduced set of functions at the beginning.
Incidentally we programmers could make a good start to accomplish that goal by NOT saving and analyzing to much information about the users and use safe ways for storing and accessing user related data!
Interesting, the rendezvous protocol does something similar to this (it grabs "buddies" in the local network)
Bittorrent is a mean of transfering static information, its not intended to have everyone become producers of new content. Also, bittorrent requires that the producer is a dedicated server until all of the clients are able to grab the information.
Diaspora claims to be such one thing.