Preventing man in the middle attack while using https - https

I am writing a little app similar to omegle. I have a http server written in Java and a client which is a html document. The main way of communication is by http requests (long polling).
I've implemented some sort of security by using the https protocol and I have a securityid for every client that connects to the server. When the client connects, the server gives it a securityid which the client must always send back when it wants a request.
I am afraid of the man in the middle attack here, do you have any suggestions how I could protect the app from such an attack.
Note that this app is build for theoretical purposes, it won't be ever used for practical reasons so your solutions don't have to be necessarily practical.

HTTPS does not only do encryption, but also authentication of the server. When a client connects, the server shows it has a valid and trustable certificate for its domain. This certificate can not simply be spoofed or replayed by a man-in-the-middle.

Simply enabling HTTPS is not good enough because the web brings too many complications.
For one thing, make sure you set the secure flag on the cookies, or else they can be stolen.
It's also a good idea to ensure users only access the site via typing https://<yourdomain> in the address bar, this is the only way to ensure an HTTPS session is made with a valid certificate. When you type https://<yourdomain>, the browser will refuse to let you on the site unless the server provides a valid certificate for <yourdomain>.
If you just type <yourdomain> without https:// in front, the browser wont care what happens. This has two implications I can think of off the top of my head:
The attacker redirects to some unicode domain with a similar name (ie: looks the same but has a different binary string and is thus a different domain) and then the attacker provides a valid certificate for that domain (since he owns it), the user probably wouldn't notice this...
The attacker could emulate the server but without HTTPS, he would make his own secured connection to the real server and become a cleartext proxy between you and the server, he can now capture all your traffic and do anything he wants because he owns your session.

Related

How can a web page send a message to the local network

Our web application has a button that is supposed to send data to a server on the local network that in turn prints something on a printer.
So far it was easy: The button triggered an AJAX POST request to http://printerserver/print.php with a token, that page connected to the web application to verify the token and get the data to print and then printed.
However, we are now delivering our web application via HTTPs (and I would rather not go back to HTTP for this) and newer versions of Chrome and Firefox don't make the request to the HTTP address anymore, they don't even send the request to check CORS headers.
Now, what is a modern alternative to the cross-protocol XHR? Do Websockets suffer from the same problem? (A Google search did not make clear what is the current state here.) Can I use TCP Sockets already? I would rather not switch to GET requests either, because the action is not idempotent and it might have practical implications with preloading and caching.
I can change the application on the printerserver in any way (so I could replace it with NodeJS or something) but I cannot change the users' browsers (to trust a self-signed certificate for printerserver for example).
You could store the print requests on the webserver in a queue and make the printserver periodically poll for requests to print.
If that isn't possible I would setup a tunnel or VPN between the webserver and printserver networks. That way you can make the print request from the webserver on the server-side instead of the client. If you use curl, there are flags to ignore invalid SSL certificates etc. (I still suspect it's nicer to introduce a queue anyway, so the print requests aren't blocking).
If the webserver can make an ssh connection to something on the network where the printserver is on, you could do something like: ssh params user#host some curl command here.
Third option I can think of, if printserver can bind to for example a subdomain of the webserver domain, like: print.somedomain.com, you may be able to make it trusted by the somedomain.com certificate, IIRC you have to create a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) from the printserver certificate, and sign it with the somedomain.com certificate. Perhaps it doesn't even need to be a subdomain for this per se, but maybe that's a requirement for the browser to do it client-side.
The easiest way is to add a route to the webapp that does nothing more than relay the request to the print server. So make your AJAX POST request to https://myapp.com/print, and the server-side code powering that makes a request to http://printerserver/print.php, with the exact same POST content it received itself. As #dnozay said, this is commonly called a reverse proxy. Yes, to do that you'll have to reconfigure your printserver to accept (authenticated) requests from the webserver.
Alternatively, you could switch the printserver to https and directly call it from the client.
Note that an insecure (http) web-socket connection on a secure (https) page probably won't work either. And for good reason: generally it's a bad idea to mislead people by making insecure connections from what appears to them to be a secure page.
The server hosting the https webapp can reverse proxy the print server,
but since the printer is local to the user, this may not work.
The print server should have the correct CORS headers
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
or:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://www.example.com
However there are pitfalls with using the wildcard.
From what I understand from the question, printserver is not accessible from the web application so the reverse proxy solution won't work here.
You are restricted from making requests from the browser to the printserver by cross-origin-policy.
If wish to communicate with the printserver from an HTTPS page you will need the printserver to expose print.php as HTTPS too.
You could create a DNS A record as a subdomain of your web application that resolves to the internal address of your printserver.
With those steps in place you should be able to update your printserver page to respond with permissive CORS headers which the browser should then respect. I don't think the browser will even issue CORS requests across different protocol schemes (HTTPS vs HTTP) or to internal domains, without a TLD.

Mac spoof HTTP response

If a program sends a http request, is there a way to spoof the data returned by the request?
For example:
Program that sends name to server to check for permission: http://example.com/test.php?name=Stackoverflow
Actual Response: HI
Response I want to spoof: HELLO
Also, are there good forms of authentication to protect against this (if it is possible).
This question is pretty open-ended, so it's hard to answer it with something terribly specific. Depending on exactly what you're trying to do, a simple proxy like Fiddler (Windows-only), Burp, etc. might do the trick. You could also play tricks with hosts files, iptables (see Otto's comment), etc. It's definitely possible, but depending on exactly what you're trying to do, some methods may be more suitable than others.
As for the second part of your question (authentication to ensure this doesn't happen), this is one of the primary purposes of HTTPS.
In its popular deployment on the internet, HTTPS provides authentication of the web site and associated web server that one is communicating with, which protects against Man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally, it provides bidirectional encryption of communications between a client and server, which protects against eavesdropping and tampering with and/or forging the contents of the communication. In practice, this provides a reasonable guarantee that one is communicating with precisely the web site that one intended to communicate with (as opposed to an impostor), as well as ensuring that the contents of communications between the user and site cannot be read or forged by any third party.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Secure

rubycas CAS over ssl, sites over non-ssl

I'm trying to determine how much of a security risk I'm looking at
when I have rubycas itself running over https, but my actual sites
running under http. the reason I'm faced with this issue is that the
sites are deployed on heroku, which means ssl is either really
expensive or really a pain.
In addition to the login details, i also pass user rolls
(authorization) to each site that is then stored in a session.
Any input is greatly appreciated.
The problem with this approach is that neither the sessionid (url or cookie) nor the exchanged data is encrypted. Therefore the data can be read and manipulated both on the way from the server to the user and on the way from the user to the server.
Even a passive attacker that can just sniff the traffic without being able to manipulate it, can create damage: The attacker can just copy the sessionid into his or her own browser. Public wireless connections often use a transparent proxy, so both the attacker and the victim have the same public ip-address, which makes it difficult for the application to tell them apart.
There is a tool called Firesheep that makes this kind of attack extremely easy.

If a website doesn't use HTTPS to do user log in, are the users passwords fairly unprotected?

This question tries to look into whether doing HTTPS log in is very important for any website.
Is it true that for many websites, if the login is done through HTTP but not HTTPS, then anybody can pretty much see the userID and password easily along the internet highway (or by looking between a router and the internet connection in an Internet Cafe)?
If so... do popular frameworks actually use HTTPS by default (or at least as an option), such as Rails 2.3.5 or Django, CakePHP, or .Net?
Yes, any machine on the pathway (that the packets pass through) can just examine the contents of the those packets. All it takes is a capturing proxy or a promiscuous mode network card with something like WireShark. Assuming that the passwords aren't encrypted in some other way (at a higher level), they will be visible.
I can't answer the second part of your question since I have no knowledge of those particular products but I would say that the inability to use secure sockets would pretty much make them useless.
Pax is right about passwords that aren't otherwise encrypted being visible.
Still, most sites don't use SSL still, and it does put the users at a certain degree of risk when accessing sites from public wifi.
HTTPS isn't a framework level option, it would be something you'd do when you set up the webserver. If you were to use an apache configuration for instance, you would open it up to a properly configured https, close http and install a certification. The framework wouldn't have a direct influence on that portion of the release.
If the user credentials are submitted via an HTML webform without HTTPS, then it is unsecure, the data is submitted in plain text. However, if the website uses HTTP authentication instead, then the server can send back a 401 reply (or 407 for proxies) to any request that does not provide valid credentials. 401/407 is the server's way to ask for credentials, and the reply provides a list of authentication schemes (Digest, NTLM, Negotiate, etc) that the server supports, which are usually more secure by themselves. The client/browser sends the same request again with the necessariy credentials in one of the schemes, then the server either sends the requested data, or sends another 401/407 reply if the credentials are rejected.

How much data is leaked from SSL connection?

Say I was trying to access https://www.secretplace.com/really/really/secret.php, what's actually sent in plain text before the SSL session is established?
Does the browser intervene, see that I want https, initiate a SSL session with secretplace.com (i.e. without passing the path in plain text) and only after the SSL session is set up pass the path?
Just curious.
HTTP Secure
The level of protection depends on the correctness of the implementation of the web browser and the server software and the actual cryptographic algorithms supported.
Also, HTTPS is vulnerable when applied to publicly-available static content. The entire site can be indexed using a web crawler, and the URI of the encrypted resource can be inferred by knowing only the intercepted request/response size. This allows an attacker to have access to the plaintext (the publicly-available static content), and the encrypted text (the encrypted version of the static content), permitting a cryptographic attack.
Because SSL operates below HTTP and has no knowledge of higher-level protocols, SSL servers can only strictly present one certificate for a particular IP/port combination. This means that, in most cases, it is not feasible to use name-based virtual hosting with HTTPS. A solution called Server Name Indication (SNI) exists which sends the hostname to the server before encrypting the connection, although many older browsers don't support this extension. Support for SNI is available since Firefox 2, Opera 8, and Internet Explorer 7 on Windows Vista.
In general, the name of the server you are talking to is leaked ("stackoverflow.com"). This was probably leaked via DNS before SSL/TLS could begin connecting, though.
The server's certificate is leaked. Any client certificate you sent (not a common configuration) may or may not have been sent in-the-clear. An active attacker (man-in-the-middle) could probably just ask your browser for it and receive it anyway.
The path portion of the URL ("/questions/2146863/how-much-data-is-leaked-from-ssl-connection") should NOT be leaked. It is passed encrypted and secure (assuming the client and server are set up correctly and you didn't click-through any certificate errors).
The other poster is correct, that there are possible traffic analysis attacks which may be able to deduce some things about static content. If the site is very large and dynamic (say stackoverflow.com) I suspect that it could be quite difficult to get much useful info out of it. However, if there are only a few files with distinctive sizes, which downloads could be obvious.
Form POST data should NOT be leaked. Although usual caveats apply if you are transmitting objects of known sizes.
Timing attacks may reveal some information. For example, an attacker ccould put stress on various parts of the application (e.g., a certain database table) or pre-load some static files from the disk and watch how your connection slows down or speeds up in response.
This is an information "leak" but probably not a big deal for most sites.
The request is made by your browser to https://url:443, and that's in the clear. Then the server and client will negotiate a ciphersuite to protect the data. Normally, this will include a symmetric encryption algorithm (eg; 3DES or RC4 or AES) and a message authentication code (such as HMAC-SHA1) to detect tampering. Note that technically, both of these are optional, it IS possible to have SSL with no encryption but unlikely today.
Once the client (your browser) and the web server have agreed on a ciphersuite and keys are determined, the rest of the conversation is protected.
To be honest, I would hook up a protocol analyzer and watch it all unfold before your eyes!!
Remember, that SSL is at the Transport layer of the TCP/IP stack, it's below the browser data, so it's all protected.
Hope that helps.

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