accessing low level attributes of a NSStream - cocoa

I have a Keyspan PCI to RS-422 adapter that I'm using to connect old serial devices to a Macintosh. I would like to use NSInputStream and NSOutputStream to read and write so that I can take advantage of asynchronous nonblocking I/O since there will be several devices attached to this system that each have their own idiosyncrasies.
My question is how can I access some low level parameters for the devices using a NSStream (baud rate, count of stop bits, parity, etc)?

I thought I researched everything before I asked the question, but the answer was in another class (NSFilehandle).

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Can I use SQLite for heavy use purpose?

Consider two application.
"A" application receives data from internet like player position and other details
"B" application which also needs the player position but it will be blocked from accessing internet. So the only way is to use SQLite sync player position (these frequently updates in milliseconds).
I can't even use socket or any other plugins too. So do you think SQLite can handle read and write in milliseconds without using CPU heavily ?
If you wish to share the data in anything like real-time then I would use something like inter-process pipes or file mapping (memory) for this.
Writing data to and reading it back from any form of hardware storage will add quite a delay to the data passing, which will only become worse as the hardware data cache is filled.
Hardware is okay for historic data.
Both are supported by Win32 and should be accessible even if you use .NET to produce a UWP application.
See here

NFC smartcard that is impossible to clone

First, I want to apologize. I am complete noob in this area and many of my thoughts are probably misleading.
I need to verify that a user of my app is on a specific place in order to be authirized to perform an action. I want to use NFC for this purpose. The user have to put his smartphone by a NFC tag in order to be authorized to perform the action. Easy but I need it to be reasonably hackerproof. It means that the NFC tag must be impossible to clone without physical damage to the plastics around the NFC chip. It also means that the NFC chip must not contain only static data. The NFC chip must contain an app, that can receive some data (cryptographic challenge) and signs them using secure built-in private key (which must be unreadable through NFC interface). When the user wants to perform the action, he will ask server for the challenge, then he lets the chip to sign it, and then he sends the signed challenge back to the server which will verify the signature using known public key. This should be achievable using NFC JavaCard. But do these NFC JavaCards actually exist? I wasn't able to find a company which would be able to produce such NFC tags for me. When I try to explain my requirements to a NFC tags producer he looks like he has never heard of NFC JavaCards. I have tried about 10 producers without luck.
Can a commonly available chip meet my requirements? I mean a chip from the Mifare familly. I suspect that Mifare DESfire might be able to meet my requirements, but I am not sure.
Feel free to respond with an advertisement, because relevant advertisement is exactly what I look for :)
I try to collect some useful facts:
NFC is a very broad term, just finding that on both sides does not ensure interoperability.
Any ISO 14443 (one of the NFC flavours) compliant smart card with crypto functionality should be usable. Note, that a card with native OS may be a viable alternative to a JavaCard, since the functionality to sign a random number is pretty standard.
Any smart phone sporting a NFC chip can address such a card in principle. Unfortunately this is strongly dependent on the OS of the smart phone, for Android the relevant class to use is IsoDep, which gives you the APDU interface. After triggering the "card enters field" event, then the app receives a handle, via which further communication can take place.
Real smart cards can't be cloned, since you are not able to dump them; especially keys can't be read.
Now some things to consider:
Your approach looks unusual, which might become a problem. (To have a portable card somehow fixed to a wall, just to get the location; so you know where somebody is, but not who? While I don't consider cloning to be an issue, you somehow must ensure destruction in case of a theft attempt, which may collide with the distance topic below.)
I don't see, where the server comes into play. If not involved in the authorized action, provision of a random number is not sufficient reason.
Asymmetric key operations have a comparatively high power consumption, and this power has to be supplied via the electric field. This severely limits the distance between card and phone and may even require direct touch. While a power supply of its own would solve the issue in principle, it is not what ISO-14443 was designed for.
Yes JavaCards do exist.
https://github.com/OpenJavaCard/openjavacard-ndef is a project makes these JavaCards to output standard NDEF messages (thought note issue 4 in that there example uses the wrong APDU but that is easily changed)
This project also give a number of cards it is fully working and tested for
ACS ACOSJ - fully working
NXP JCOP J3D040/J3D081/J2E145 etc - fully working
Both ACS and Cardlogic do cards (just google the model numbers)
e.g.
https://www.acs.com.hk/en/products/405/acosj-java-card-combi/
https://www.smartcardfocus.com/shop/ilp/id~707/j3a081-80k/p/index.shtml
The answer a was looking for is not a chip which runs a custom code. Although this might be possible it is definitely not the best way to achieve the target.
I was looking for a solution that enables strong authentication using NFC data. There might be multiple chips that offers this, but probably the most available chip is NTAG 424 DNA TT. It works like this:
The chip has a memory, which is not readable through NFC. Private key is stored there.
The chip has a read counter. It increments everytime the data are read through NFC.
The chip can generate an AES-128 signature of string UID (chip serial number) + counter using the private key in the inaccessible part of the memory.
The chip can dynamicaly inject the data above into a URL that is stored in the readable memory.
So the solution will be like (I am waiting for delivery of NFC tags right now, so I don't know for sure yet):
Read the tag UID (serial number) and the actual counter value (should be 0 on an unused tag)
Generate the key-pair
Load private key to the chip
Load some data (URL, eg: https://my.app/) to the chip
Store UID, public-key, last-counter on the server
Configure the chip to inject UID, counter, signature to the URL stored on the chip
When a client reads the data, they should contain required variables, eg: https://my.app/?counter=1&uid=ff:ff:ff:ff&signature=xyz. Then on the server:
Fetch stored info (public-key, last-counter) using uid as a primary key
verifies the signature
verifies the counter that must be > last-counter
stores counter as the last-counter
successfully authorized
Is anyone able to hack this without reading the hidden memory of the chip which would require physical tampering with the chip?

Problems getting Altera's Triple Speed Ethernet IP core to work

I am using a Cyclone V on a SoCKit board (link here) (provided by Terasic), connecting an HSMC-NET daughter card (link here) to it in order to create a system that can communicate using Ethernet while communication that is both transmitted and received goes through the FPGA - The problem is, I am having a really, really hard time getting this system to work using Altera's Triple Speed Ethernet core.
I am using Qsys to construct the system that contains the Triple Speed Ethernet core, instantiating it inside a VHDL wrapper that also contains an instantiation of a packet generator module, connected directly to the transmit Avalon-ST sink port of the TSE core and controlled through an Avalon-MM slave interface connected to a JTAG to Avalon Master bridge core which has it's master port exported to the VHDL wrapper as well.
Then, using System Console, I am configuring the Triple Speed Ethernet core as described in the core's user guide (link here) at section 5-26 (Register Initialization) and instruct the packet generator module (also using System Console) to start and generate Ethernet packets into the TSE core's transmit Avalon-ST sink interface ports.
Although having everything configured exactly as described in the core's user guide (linked above) I cannot get it to output anything on the MII/GMII output interfaces, neither get any of the statistics counters to increase or even change - clearly, I am doing something wrong, or missing something, but I just can't find out what exactly it is.
Can any one please, please help me with this?
Thanks ahead,
Itamar
Starting the basic checks,
Have you simulated it? It's not clear to me if you are just simulating or synthesizing.
If you haven't simulated, you really should. If it's not working in SIM, why would it ever work in real life.
Make sure you are using the QIP file to synthesize the design. It will automatically include your auto generated SDC constraints. You will still need to add your own PIN constraints, more on that later.
The TSE is fairly old and reliable, so the obvious first things to check are Clock, Reset, Power and Pins.
a.) Power is usually less of problem on devkits if you have already run the demo that came with the kit.
b.) Pins can cause a whole slew of issues if they are not mapped right on this core. I'll assume you are leveraging something from Terasic. It should define a pin for reset, input clock and signal standards. Alot of times, this goes in the .qsf file, and you also reference the QIP file (mentioned above) in here too.
c.) Clock & Reset is a more likely culprit in my mind. No activity on the interface is kind of clue. One way to check, is to route your clocks to spare pins and o-scope them and insure they are what you think they are. Similarly, if you may want to bring out your reset to a pin and check it. MAKE SURE YOU KNOW THE POLARITY and you haven't been using ~reset in some places and non-inverted reset in others.
Reconfig block. Some Altera chips and certain versions of Quartus require you to use a reconfig block to configure the XCVR. This doesn't seem like your issue to me because you say the GMII is flat lined.

How "Unique" and safe actually is WMI Win32_xxxxx serial number property? (aka is it possible to change it by any way?)

As read on topic here How to find the unique serial number of a flash device? and especially here How to get manufacturer serial number of an USB flash drive? I know it is possible to get properties of hardware devices (particularly hard drives and usb drives...) using WMI Win32_PhysicalMedia and Win32_DiskDrive, which I'm getting done successfully.
However, I really want to know about the safety of these informations.
PhysicalMedia property SerialNumber returns the actual serial number of the main hard drive, while using other Win32_LogicalDisk and other calls we can map the drive letter of flash storage to actual Win32_DiskDrive device, and from there read properties like Name, Model, FirmwareRevision, SerialNumber, DeviceID, Manufacturer...
Now, DeviceID is generated by Windows / Pc itself, while SerialNumber should be the one that manufacturer added to the physical flash drive.
Manufacturer in most cases returns "Standard" something, Name is also of no use, while SerialNumber actually gets me a something that looks like unique ID, (I've read that in some cases this is not returned, so PNPDeviceID should be used instead? , Model gives the actual model of the flash drive, and FirmwareRevision just a number that could be used to add safety switch to the licensing, but is not vital.
However, the only one of these that seems / should be actually safe to use is SerialNumber, right?
So, the question here goes: Which level is Win32_DiskDrive actually reading this info from? Is it possible to fake that at all (Ok, letalone the actual lowlevel hacking stuff or driver injection etc...(??)), and if so, how hard it is?
If there's a known way / guide / example, I'd be also happy to read it. (not necessary info looking for here though.)
This is not for intention of bypassing some licensing. I'm making licensing for my SW, and am curious, whether it would be safe enough to use USB drive's SerialNumber property, and lock license against the presence of that USB flash, for which the license was bought for? Basically to use it as kind of a dongle, but not like the dongles actually work (using communication with the actual hardware inside the dongle...)
I know it may not seem as a safe solution, as flash drives dies quite often these days, or get lost etc, but this is just to add an option to my licensing from "Per PC" to "Portable - per USB device".
Thanks for any info!!!
EDIT:
I am completely aware that bypassing these kind of safety switches is very possible. Of course, even Windows itself is not licensed in a way that couldn't be hacked, nor Adobe, ProTools etc, (software that is widely used and costs a lot!).
But that wasn't a real question, and also, that's not the case for me -> the software will not be that expensive and not used by that much people, that I'd be afraid to drag interest in someone who will do extensive programming to make a patch/crack for it. Regular debugger use and workaround is pretty unlikely to be used by regular client who would need the software, ( and also, since it is something to be used in business environment, where stability is vital, I doubt they will really play around that...).
Main point here:
It is possible for sure, but: HOW hard is it to do for a regular person? (I know, the answer is: depending on your code.)
Main question of the post: Is it possible to change the ID on the USB itself, OR to make an app that will fake that data to my app? If it is, I'm sure it might be easier than making a crack/patch, that's why I wanted to know, whether WMI reads explicitly from hardware, or could one make an app that would pass fake data to it?
WMI just returns what the hardware tells it. It's as unique as the hardware. Which ultimately depends on the vendor.
But...
If someone has an administrator account to the computer†, then there are very few things that can be done to keep them from just hooking up the kernel debugger to your program and overriding your checks, or recording the raw USB communication session and replaying it on an unauthorized system. The real dongles do some to mitigate this, by having the hardware generate a response to a particular challenge. The challenge/response changes for each request, so it's not as susceptible to replay attacks, but the debugger tricks still work.
This is the real problem with the serial number approach. Uniqueness is not the primary concern for dongled software. The primary concern is unpredictability.
An illustrative example-
Let's say that I'm a bouncer at an exclusive night club. We're so exclusive that you have to answer a question to get in. You really want to get in, but no one will tell you the answer to the question. One night, you hatch a plan. You hang out in the alley and listen to the conversations that I'm having with the patrons trying to enter the club. It doesn't take you long to realize that I'm asking everyone the exact same question, and you're in. (This is the serial number approach)
After a while, I notice that there are a lot of people coming into the club that I've never seen before, and begin to suspect something. The people we really want to allow in are all given a card with a formula‡ on it. Whenever they come to the door of the club, I give them a number and they apply their formula and tell me the result. Since I also know the formula, I can tell if they are really allowed in. Now, even if you hear the entire challenge and response, without the formula, you aren't getting in. (This is one common approach taken by dongles.)
But what about the debugger? The debugger just made herself the club's owner, fired me, and can come and go as she pleases.
†Or has physical access to the machine and a password reset disk.
‡Stop laughing, this could totally happen. :)
Photo credit: Guillaume Paumier, CC-BY. Found on the Wikimedia Commons 7-Oct-15
Edit to address the question edit:
HOW hard is it to do for a regular person? (I know, the answer is: depending on your code.)
The question is how skilled is the 'regular person'? If you're talking about software/electrical engineers, then this is a trivial task. If you're talking about sales/marketing then it's a challenging task.
Is it possible to change the ID on the USB itself, OR to make an app that will fake that data to my app?
It depends and Yes. Changing the ID on the device itself is possible with some devices, and impossible with others. Software to spoof/man-in-the-middle the USB communication, or to create a virtual USB device is possible.
If it is, I'm sure it might be easier than making a crack/patch, that's why I wanted to know, whether WMI reads explicitly from hardware, or could one make an app that would pass fake data to it?
As I led with above, WMI reads from the hardware. This can be intercepted or bypassed.
Some ways to bypass the check:
Make a virtual USB device
Modify the USB MSD device driver to report the same serial number for all devices.
Build hardware using commercially available cheap host controllers that identifies with the same information as the authorized device. ($10 worth of raw components and a little bit of time.)
Redirect the system calls to/from USB to a compromised library.
Note also that:
Some places have restrictions on USB storage devices, ranging from discouraging their use, to outright bans. This would prevent your software from being used in sensitive computing environments processing private data, like credit cards, PII, trade secrets, classified information, etc. (In the US many governmental agencies have outright bans on USB storage devices, and block the install of any MSD.)
The Mass Storage specification doesn't require serial numbers. They are usually there, but they don't have to be, and many low-cost vendors
A USB PKI token costs a little bit more, but would probably do what you want. Here's an example from Safenet (Disclaimer: I am in no way affiliated with Safenet Inc, and you should evaluate all the possible options from all vendors. I suggested this because it was the first thing that came up through CDW, and the price was ~$30)

Kernel module to get network jitter and bandwidth?

I need to get a list of interfaces on my local machine, along with their IP addresses, MACs and a set of QoS measurements ( Delay, Jitter, Error rate, Loss Rate, Bandwidth)...
I'm writing a kernel module to read these information from local network devices,So far I've extracted every thing mentioned above except for both Jitter and Bandwidth...
I'm using linux kernel 2.6.35
It depends what you mean by bandwidth. In most cases you only get from the PHY something that is better called bitrate. I guess you rather need some kind of information on the available bandwidth at a higher layer, which you can't get without active or passive measurements done, e.g. sending ICMP echo-like probe packets, and investigating replies. You should also make clear what the two points in the network are (both the actual endpoints and the communication layer) between which you would like to measure available bandwidth.
As for jitter you also need to do some kind of measurements, basically the same way as above.
I know this is an old post, but you could accomplish at least getting jitter by inspecting the RTCP packets if they're available. They come in on the +1 of the RTP port and come along with any RTP stream as far as I've seen. A lot of information can be gotten from RTCP, but for your purposes just the basic source description would do it:
EDIT: (didn't look at the preview)
Just check out this link for the details of the protocol, but you can get the jitter pretty easily from an RTCP packet.
Depending on what you're using the RTP stream for too there are a lot of other resources, like the VoIP Metrics Report Block in the Extended Report (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3611#page-25).
EDIT:
As per Artem's request here is a basic flow of how you might do it:
An RTP stream is started on say port 16400 (the needed drivers/mechanism for this to happen are most likely already in place).
Tell the kernel to start listening on port 16401 (1 above your RTP stream's port) as well; this is where the RTCP pkts will start coming in.
As the RTCP pkts come in send them wherever you want to handle them (ie, if you're wanting to parse it in userspace or something).
Parse the pkts for the desired data. I'm not aware of a particular lib to do this, but it's pretty easy to just point some struct at it (in C) and dereference, watching out for Endianess.

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