Sorry for the noobish question, this is the first time i try to implement a REST interface (in PHP). Anyway, because the stateless nature of HTTP protocol, what's the best practice in order to ensure that:
GET/ /user/{id}/friends
is always and only executed by the current authenticated user? Is session usually used as a method to restrict REST access?
You can use HTTP sessions, which are nothing more than server-side cookies. They're usually ok, but there has been a lot of reports of session hijacking lately. So my answer if you're really concerned about this is to use HMAC. It's tricky to set up, but once it is you can be sure that the message really did come from an authenticated user.
Related
I read this article on using Spring Security to "secure" (password-protect) a REST-like service: http://www.baeldung.com/2011/10/31/securing-a-restful-web-service-with-spring-security-3-1-part-3/.
This solution is what I seem to want, however, I noticed that at the bottom of the article, the authentication process is based on a cookie. If you notice, after a user logs in, a cookie is sent back to the user, and the user keeps using this cookie on subsequent request to access the REST endpoints (see the curl commands).
My concern about this approach centers on security; meaning, what's to stop the user from sending this cookie to someone else for use or someone from copying this cookie and using the REST service without proper authentication?
Is there a way to set the cookie (or cookies) such that it is valid for only one user? For example, for only the IP that authenticated correctly? But even this is problematic, as multiple users may share one external IP address.
It looks like the code is just demonstrating how to maintain a session between requests, exactly as your browser would do, by storing the JSESSIONID cookie. So I think your question is really the same as "what's to stop a user from copying the session cookie from their browser and giving it to someone else?". Of course there is nothing to stop them doing that but why would they want to? The same argument applies to any kind of security token. There's nothing to stop them giving away their username and password either which would have the same effect.
In most cases a web service would be stateless, so it wouldn't use session cookies. But OAuth tokens and so on are just as sensitive, often more so since they usually have a longer life span.
I know that this topic has been discussed a lot, but I believe that I've found a new variation of it: I have a Rails 4 application, which was upgraded from Rails 3, and which has the rails_ujs and csrf_meta_tags setup correctly.
Once the root_url is loaded in the browser, there is a javascript that fires a GET and a PUT, each one to its respective controller API in the application. By the moment those 2 API calls are fired, the session SHOULD have the _csrf_token there. And this is true, most of the times. Keep reading.
The problem is that, SOMETIMES, not always, we see some InvalidAuthenticityToken exceptions happening for the PUT request. (yes, I'm using protect_from_forgery :with => :exception on our API base controllers).
Analyzing the dump from exception_notification, I can see that the CSRF_TOKEN is setup correctly in the request header, but the most intriguing thing is that the session has only the session_id on it. Everything else is gone, including the _csrf_token.
Remember: this is happening intermittently! So I believe that it must be some kind of race condition.
This app is hosted on Heroku and running on Unicorn. I'm unable to reproduce the problem in my local environment. I've also read a lot of Rails code on github trying to understand the flows in which it resets the session, but I could not find the answer, since all CSRF protection is setup correctly and the problem happens intermittently.
It's also worth mentioning that we did not setup config.secret_key_base yet. But as this problem is happening intermittently, I don't think that this may be the root cause of it.
Also, I believe its worth mentioning that we have two controller hierarchies:
(1) all 'normal' application requests go through controllers which inherits from ApplicationController
(2) all API requests go through controllers which inherits from Api::BaseController, which inherits from ActionController::Base directly
I believe this controllers scheme is the most common for everybody...
The API endpoint for the GET request is rendering a json response. The API endpoint for the PUT request is returning head :ok.
Well, I would love if some Ruby on Rails expert could help on this.
Are you using the standard cookie-based session store? The cookie-based session store, last i looked, most definitely was subject to race-conditions, especially around AJAX requests -- and the race conditions were kind of an inherent part of the design of a cookie-based session store, with no real way to fix it.
This post from 2011 describes a cookie store race condition that also involves the authenticity token, and may be similar to yours. Their solution was turning off the CSRF protection, for certain actions anyway, which doesn't sound like a great solution to me.
This post from 2014 outlines race conditions with cookie session store, and suggests ActiveRecord or other server-side store as a solution. (As i write this, that URL is 404'ing, but available in google cache).
As you can see from the example, the session cookie is updated on every request, regardless of if the session was modified or not. Depending on when the response gets back to the client last, thats the cookie that will be used in the next call. For example, if in our previous example, if get_current_result’s response was slower than get_quiz, then our cookie would have the correct data and the next call to update_response would of work fine! So sometimes it will work and sometimes not all depending on the internet gods. This type of race condition is no fun to deal with.
The implications of this is that using cookie storage for sessions when you are doing multiple ajax call is just not safe. All information saved in the session might be wrong or nonexistent next time you check. So whats the solution?
...
A better solution would be to use a server side session store like active record or memcache. Doing so prevents the session data from being reliant on client side cookies. Session data no longer has to be passed between the client and the server which means no more potential race conditions when two ajax are simultaneously made!
I can't say for sure if you are running into that problem, but it would be worth a try to switch to the ActiveRecord cookie store, and see if your problem goes away.
Even the activerecord-based session store has at times in the past been subject to race conditions, I am not sure if the current implementation is, but they are at least conceivably solvable, whereas the race conditions in cookie-based store are fundamental.
The ActiveRecord store is probably subject to analagous race conditions to the cookie store actually -- IF you have more than one app process running (or a multi-threaded app server), so concurrent request handling is still possible, a very similar race condition is probably still possible. Although it should probably be even rarer than the race condition with the cookie store, and it is theoretically solvable, although perhaps with some domain-specific logic, unlike the race condition with the cookie store that is pretty much unsolvable if you are doing any async ajax.
For better format, write this as an answer, maybe it should be a comment though.
I met a similar problem, the root reason is my app called current_user before protect_from_forgery executed, this is current_user implementation in Devise:
def current_#{mapping}
#current_#{mapping} ||= warden.authenticate(scope: :#{mapping})
end
And Devise have a feature config.clean_up_csrf_token_on_authentication = true.
So the problem is, csrf token has been reset after current_user get invoked. because it calls warden.authenticate. Then when running protect_from_forgery. a csrf error has been raised. your session will be reset or an exception raised.
Hope this can help.
I have a standard HTML login page, which I would much rather use than the standard HTTP authentication pop-up provided by browsers. Today, I am using session cookies to keep track of the session after logging in, but I'd like to be stateless and pass the HTTP authentication every time. The web services I am hitting already support this, so this is a browser-only issue.
Adding authentication credentials is trivial in jQuery, but I don't know how to keep them around. If you go from the login page (a jsp) to the Home page (another jsp) you clearly don't keep the username and password fields from the login page. I know some browsers will store your HTTP authentication credentials if you enter them from the pop-up, but I don't know if they get stored when using an XHRRequest. If they do, is there much consistency among browsers?
Also, the user needs to be able to "sign out" of the application, too. If the browser stores the authentication credentials, is there a way to clear them using JavaScript.
I feel like I can't be the first person to try to solve this. Is there some jQuery plugin or something that already handles this? Or is it simply not possible to do what I'm trying to do?
You have 2 options:
1) Client-side storage of credentials -- not a good idea. For obvious reasons you don't want to store the username/password on the client. If you had a hashed version of the password, it might not be so bad, but still not recommended. In any case, if you're going to store on the client side, you either have to use a cookie, or HTML5 local storage (which is not widely supported, yet)
2) Server-side storage of credentials -- typically done with sessions. Then the resultant Session ID can be passed back to the client and persisted in either a cookie or in the URL of each subsequent AJAX call (?SESSID=xyz for example)
The server-side approach would be the most secure, reliable, and easiest to implement
Okay, I'll take a stab at helping ...
Firstly, understand how HTTP authentication works. There are two versions - Basic and Digest. Basic transmits in plaintext, digest is encrypted. With these types of authentication, the username/password are passed in the HTTP header with every single request. The browser captures these at login and they are stored in an inaccessible browser session cookie which is deleted when the browser session is closed. So, in answer to one of your questions, you can't access these from javascript.
You could create your own session cookie variables for username and password. The jQuery functions for this are really simple. See jquery-cookie module as one example of how to set session cookies. These could be retrieved from the session cookie and sent with each ajax request and validated in the server. However, this is not a particulary good way to do authentication since sniffing the network will allow anybody to easily grab your auth details. But, it would work.
Using session cookie based authentication where the session ID is sent sent with each request is the best way to do this. At the server side, you need to have a function called for every HTTP request. This function should do the following:
check to see if the session has been authenticated
if no:
redirect to login screen
if yes:
do authorization and allow the user access to the page
Most web frameworks support session cookie authentication and the management of session ids at the server. This is definately the way to go.
This is interesting one.
Manage user sessions on server by use of cookies. Create a session when user first accesses the login page and pass the session id/key as value to one of the cookie via response. When the user is authenticated put user "key" info in cookie and "values" in application context at server. Once user is logged, any subsequent request will be authenticated based on session cookie value at server. Authorization will be done based on user "key" passed as cookie value.
On logout clear the session based cookies from server and refresh the site to default page.
Cookies are bizarre with different browsers - just a note ;)
Hope this helps.
Update
The answer below was posted in 2012 and the links are mostly dead. However, since then, a more elegant standards-based approach to the same solution appeared using JSON Web Tokens. Here is a good blog post explaining how to use them.
Most answers miss the point, which is to avoid having any server-side session. I don't want any application state in the server. I'll award the bounty to answer that came closest, but the real credit goes to the rest-discuss group and Jon Moore for the correct answer and to Mike Amundsen for helping me to actually understand it.
The best answer I've gotten is to use a cookie, but not the typical automatic session id cookie given to you by most application servers. The cookie (which will automatically be sent with each subsequent request) is a user identifier and time signed by the server. You can include an expiration time with the cookie so it simulates the typical 30 minute session on a server (which means you have to push it forward with subsequent requests) as well as keeps the same cookie from being valid forever.
The XHR/AJAX part is a red herring. This will work whether you are doing XHR requests or an old-fashioned page-by-page web application. The main points are:
The cookie is automatically sent on subsequent requests so there's no
special scripting required - it's just how browsers work already.
The server does not need to store any session for the user, so the user
can hit any server in a cluster and not have to re-authenticate.
Slightly interesting in that you consider pushing some of the authent to the client. If you want a conventional solution, KOGI's server-side suggestion is the way to go.
But you also seem to be asking questions about memory leaks involving your user supplied secrets. Good questions. But to take a general stab at answering that I'd say it would have to be browser specific. It's browser internals, javascript engine internals -dependent where a client side application (i.e., the browser, or js in the browser) is storing the values the user inputs.
Most likely those values are not replicated needlessly throughout memory, but there's no way to guarantee that. Apart from responsible javascript coding practices, there's nothing you can do to guarantee the limit of locations of user inputs.
Slight digression
The basic point is if you store it on the client it is not really secure -- unless, the serve stores encrypted information on the client with a key that only the server (or the user via their correct credentials), has. So you could conceivably code a JS application to do some authent on the client -- much the same as how bank card (used to?) do POS authent by checking the PIN to the PIN on the card, and not back at the DB. It's based on the (somewhat flimsy) assumption the user has no direct read/write access of the "dark area" cookie/local storage on client / mag strip on bank card. So I would only advise this as disqualifier for false authents and not as a sole qualifier for the credentials.
Main point
If you do want to be stateless, just store user credentials in localstorage, or as a cookie but encrypt them with a server key. When you need them send an XHR with the encrypted / use stored credentials to the server over HTTPS, let your server decrypt them and send them to the callback. Then pass those cleartext of HTTPS to do your authent.
My question is that suppose, in my web app, I use ajax to call upon methods on the server side, isn't it creating a security hole in the app? Like, say I have an option for the user to deactivate the account, which can be done by clicking a button. This is done via Ajax.
So, can't a hacker send a request to the server to deactivate the account instead of the user?
HELP!!!
My question is that suppose, in my web app, I use ajax to call upon methods on the server side, isn't it creating a security hole in the app?
From a security perspective, there is no difference between an HTTP request that involves JavaScript and one which doesn't (e.g. that uses a regular form, or is handcrafted).
… but you can't call methods from the client, you can only make requests to URIs. The server might cause a method to be called based on receiving a request to a specific URI.
So, can't a hacker send a request to the server to deactivate the account instead of the user?
They could, which is why you need (trustworthy) authentication / authorisation and CSRF protection (just like you would for a request to disable an account that didn't involve Ajax).
This is not a problem with AJAX alone, but with any arbitrary HTTP request that wants to authenticate/maintain a session. The user needs to be authenticated in some way in order to make requests, this is usually done with cookies. Using AJAX does not make the matter any worse though because it is still a HTTP request.
Authentication alone is not enough though, someone could always be listening on the wire and capture the authentication cookie, and thus get hold of the session - "become you". The only solution here is to encrypt the connection on a lower OSI layer level (using SSL/TLS). This is why you should always use SSL when it comes to authentication.
This Ruby on Rails security guide has a great explanation on how to deal with AJAX requests that could be potentially exploited. It's not specific to RoR so the concepts can apply to any platform.
One way to reduce the risk of cross site requests is to use POST for actions that modify or delete data.
I am currently working on the authentication of an AJAX based site, and was wondering if anybody had any reccomendations on best practices for this sort of thing.
My original approach was a cookie based system. Essentially I set a cookie with an auth code, and every data access changed the cookie. As well, whenever there was a failed authentication, all sessions by that user were de-authenticated, to keep hijackers out. To hijack a session, somebody would have to leave themselves logged in, and a hacker would need to have the very last cookie update sent to spoof a session.
Unfortunatley, due to the nature of AJAX, when making multiple requests quickly, they might come back out of order, setting the cookie wrong, and breaking the session, so I need to reimplement.
My ideas were:
A decidedly less secure session based method
using SSL over the whole site (seems like overkill)
Using an iFrame which is ssl authenticated to do secure transactions (I just sorta assume this is possible, with a little bit of jquery hacking)
The issue is not the data being transferred, the only concern is that somebody might get control over an account that is not theirs.
A decidedly less secure session based method
Personally, I have not found using SSL for the entire site (or most of it) to be overkill. Maybe a while ago when speeds and feeds were slower. Now I wouldn't hesitate to put any part of a site under SSL.
If you've decided that using SSL for the entire site is acceptable, you might consider just using the old "Basic Authentication" where the server returns the 401 response which causes the browser to prompt for username/password. If your application can live with this type of login, is works great for AJAX and all other accesses to your site because the browser handles re-submitting requests with appropriate credentials (and it is safe if you use SSL, but only if you use SSL -- don't use Basic auth with plain http!).
SSL is a must, preventing transparent proxy connections that could be used by several users. Then I'd simply check the incoming ip address with the one that got authenticated.
Re-authenticate:
as soon as the ip address changes
on a time out bigger than n seconds without any request
individually on any important transaction
A common solution is to hash the user's session id and pass that in with every request to ensure the request is coming from a valid user (see this slideshow). This is reasonably secure from a CSRF perspective, but if someone was sniffing the data it could be intercepted. Depending on your needs, ssl is always going to be the most secure method.
What if you put a "generated" timestamp on each of the responses from the server and the AJAX application could always use the cookie with the latest timestamp.
Your best bet is using an SSL connection over a previously authenticated connection with something Apache and/or Tomcat. Form based authentication in either one, with a required SSL connection gives you a secure connection. The webapp can then provide security and identity for the session and the client side Ajax doesn't need to be concerned with security.
You might try reading the book Ajax Security,by Billy Hoffman and Bryan Sullivan. I found it changed my way of thinking about security. There are very specific suggestions for each phase of Ajax.