I often encounter advice for protecting a web application against a number of vulnerabilities, like SQL injection and other types of injection, by doing input validation.
It's sometimes even said to be the single most important technique.
Personally, I feel that input validation for security reasons is never necessary and better replaced with
if possible, not mixing user input with a programming language at all (e.g. using parameterized SQL statements instead of concatenating input in the query strings)
escaping user input before mixing it with a programming or markup language (e.g. html escaping, javascript escaping, ...)
Of course for a good UX it's best to catch input that would generate errors on the backand early in the GUI, but that's another matter.
Am I missing something or is the only purpose to try to make up for mistakes against the above two rules?
Yes you are generally correct.
A piece of data is only dangerous when "used". And it is only dangerous if it has special meaning in the context it is used.
For example, <script> is only dangerous if used in output to an HTML page.
Robert'); DROP TABLE Students;-- is only dangerous when used in a database query.
Generally, you want to make this data "safe" as late as possible. Such as HTML encoding when output as HTML to an HTML page, and parameterised when inserting into a database. The big advantage of this is that when the data is later retrieved from these locations, it will be returned in its original, unsanitized format.
So if you have the value A&B O'Leary in an input field, it would be encoded like so:
<input type="hidden" value="A& O'Leary" />
and if this is submitted to your application, your programming framework will automatically decode it for you back to A&B O'Leary. Same with your DB:
string name = "A&B O'Leary";
string sql = "INSERT INTO Customers (Name) VALUES (#Name)";
SqlCommand command = new SqlCommand(sql);
command.Parameters.Add("#Name", name];
Simples.
Additionally if you then need to give the user any output in plain text, you should retrieve it from your DB and spit it out. Or in JavaScript - you just JavaScript entity encode (although best avoided for complexity reasons - I find it easier to secure if I only output to HTML then read the values from the DOM).
If you'd HTML encoded it early, then to output to JavaScript/JSON you'd first have to convert it back then hex entity encode it. It will get messy and some developers will forget they have to decode first and you will have &s everywhere.
You can use validation as an additional defence, but it should not be the first port of call. For example, if you are validating a UK postcode you would want to whitelist the alphanumeric characters in upper and lower cases. Any other characters would be rejected or removed by your application. This can reduce the chances of SQLi or XSS occurring on your application, but this method falls down where you need inputs to include characters that have special meaning to your output context (" '<> etc). For example, on Stack Overflow if they did not allow characters such as these you would be preventing questions and answers from including code snippets which would pretty much make the site useless.
Not all SQL statements are parameterizable. For example, if you need to use dynamic identifiers (as opposed to literals). Even whitelisting can be hard, sometimes it needs to be dynamic.
Escaping XSS on output is a good idea. Until you forget to escape it on your admin dashboard too and they steal all your admin's cookies. Don't let XSS in your database.
Related
I have recently received a recommendation, from a third party, to encode HTML special characters in all server responses "for security reasons". So:
' --> '
& --> &
e.g.
{ "id": 1, "name": "Miles O'Brien" }
Question: Is there a security gain in doing this, or is it just a paranoia?
& --> &
Are you sure this was the kind of encoding they meant?
There is a reason to encode HTML-special characters being returned inside JSON responses, and that's to avoid XSS causing by unwanted type-sniffing. For example if you had:
{ "name": "<body>Mister <script>...</script>" }
and an attacker included a link to your JSON-returning resource in an HTML context (eg iframe src) then a stupid browser might decide that, due to the giveaway string <body>, your document was not a JSON object but an HTML document. It could then execute the script in your security context, leading to XSS vulns.
The solution to this is to use JSON string literal escaping, for example:
{ "name": "\u003Cbody\u003EMister \u003Cscript\u003E...\u003C/script\u003E" }
Using HTML-escaping in this context, whilst it avoids the problem, has the side-effect of changing the meaning of the strings. "Miles O'Brien" read by a JSON parser is still Miles O'Brien with the ampersand-x-twenty-seven in it, so if you're writing that value to the page using the likes of .value, .textContent or jQuery .text() it's going to look weird.
Now if you were assigning that string to .innerHTML or jQuery .html() instead, then yeah, you'd definitely need to HTML-escape it at some point, regardless of the JSON XSS problem. However I'd suggest that in this case, for separation-of-concerns reasons, that point should be at the client end where you're actually injecting the content into HTML markup, rather than the server side generating the JSON. In general it is better to avoid injecting strings into markup anyhow, when safer DOM-style methods are available.
Depending on what you are using the data for, yes there is a security benefit.
If you were taking user input, and sending it back to your server, then using it to interact with your database; I could potentially terminate one of your strings, and inject my own SQL statements. And even without a malicious mindset, you sending around quotation characters could accidentally terminate strings.
There seems to be a tendency to protect novice/stupid/naive developers from creating XSS holes in their sites. Especially when someone else is going to deal with these responses (e.g. open API, some junior developer on your team) he might forget to properly HTML-encode the strings before feeding them to some $('#myelement).html() method. The idea is that escaping these responses on the server will result in double escaping (worst case) for developers who don't understand escaping, whereas "smart" developers will know when to unescape the values before using them. The alternative being that "less smart" developers will create a site filled with XSS security holes.
Personally I'm not a big fan of this tendency, but I certainly see how it will result in a safer internet overall, especially as web development is more and more being practiced as a hobby.... What you choose to do is up to you, but this is the rationale behind the request to html-escape all strings in JSON.
Examples of others doing this:
Spotify
Open Social (I don't have a link, I'm sure you'll take my word for it)
From everything I've seen, it seems like the convention for escaping html on user-entered content (for the purposes of preventing XSS) is to do it when rendering content. Most templating languages seem to do it by default, and I've come across things like this stackoverflow answer arguing that this logic is the job of the presentation layer.
So my question is, why is this the case? To me it seems cleaner to escape on input (i.e. form or model validation) so you can work under the assumption that anything in the database is safe to display on a page, for the following reasons:
Variety of output formats - for a modern web app, you may be using a combination of server-side html rendering, a JavaScript web app using AJAX/JSON, and mobile app that receives JSON (and which may or may not have some webviews, which may be JavaScript apps or server-rendered html). So you have to deal with html escaping all over the place. But input will always get instantiated as a model (and validated) before being saved to db, and your models can all inherit from the same base class.
You already have to be careful about input to prevent code-injection attacks (granted this is usually abstracted to the ORM or db cursor, but still), so why not also worry about html escaping here so you don't have to worry about anything security-related on output?
I would love to hear the arguments as to why html escaping on page render is preferred
In addition to what has been written already:
Precisely because you have a variety of output formats, and you cannot guarantee that all of them will need HTML escaping. If you are serving data over a JSON API, you have no idea whether the client needs it for a HTML page or a text output (e.g. an email). Why should you force your client to unescape "Jack & Jill" to get "Jack & Jill"?
You are corrupting your data by default.
When someone does a keyword search for 'amp', they get "Jack & Jill". Why? Because you've corrupted your data.
Suppose one of the inputs is a URL: http://example.com/?x=1&y=2. You want to parse this URL, and extract the y parameter if it exists. This silently fails, because your URL has been corrupted into http://example.com/?x=1&y=2.
It's simply the wrong layer to do it - HTML related stuff should not be mixed up with raw HTTP handling. The database shouldn't be storing things that are related to one possible output format.
XSS and SQL Injection are not the only security problems, there are issues for every output you deal with - such as filesystem (think extensions like '.php' that cause web servers to execute code) and SMTP (think newline characters), and any number of others. Thinking you can "deal with security on input and then forget about it" decreases security. Rather you should be delegating escaping to specific backends that don't trust their input data.
You shouldn't be doing HTML escaping "all over the place". You should be doing it exactly once for every output that needs it - just like with any escaping for any backend. For SQL, you should be doing SQL escaping once, same goes for SMTP etc. Usually, you won't be doing any escaping - you'll be using a library that handles it for you.
If you are using sensible frameworks/libraries, this is not hard. I never manually apply SQL/SMTP/HTML escaping in my web apps, and I never have XSS/SQL injection vulnerabilities. If your method of building web pages requires you to remember to apply escaping, or end up with a vulnerability, you are doing it wrong.
Doing escaping at the form/http input level doesn't ensure safety, because nothing guarantees that data doesn't get into your database or system from another route. You've got to manually ensure that all inputs to your system are applying HTML escaping.
You may say that you don't have other inputs, but what if your system grows? It's often too late to go back and change your decision, because by this time you've got a ton of data, and may have compatibility with external interfaces e.g. public APIs to worry about, which are all expecting the data to be HTML escaped.
Even web inputs to the system are not safe, because often you have another layer of encoding applied e.g. you might need base64 encoded input in some entry point. Your automatic HTML escaping will miss any HTML encoded within that data. So you will have to do HTML escaping again, and remember to do, and keep track of where you have done it.
I've expanded on these here: http://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/why-escape-on-input-is-a-bad-idea/
The original misconception
Do not confuse sanitation of output with validation.
While <script>alert(1);</script> is a perfectly valid username, it definitely must be escaped before showing on the website.
And yes, there is such a thing as "presentation logic", which is not related to "domain business logic". And said presentation logic is what presentation layer deals with. And the View instances in particular. In a well written MVC, Views are full-blown objects (contrary to what RoR would try to to tell you), which, when applied in web context, juggle multiple templates.
About your reasons
Different output formats should be handled by different views. The rules and restrictions, which govern HTML, XML, JSON and other formats, are different in each case.
You always need to store the original input (sanitized to avoid injections, if you are not using prepared statements), because someone might need to edit it at some point.
And storing original and the xss-safe "public" version is waste. If you want to store sanitized output, because it takes too much resources to sanitize it each time, then you are already pissing at the wrong tree. This is a case, when you use cache, instead of polluting the database.
I do not want to be too strict as there may be thousands of possible characters in a possible first name
Normal english alphabets, accented letters, non english letters, numbers(??), common punctuation synbols
e.g.
D'souza
D'Anza
M.D. Shah (dots and space)
Al-Rashid
Jatin "Tom" Shah
However, I do not want to except HTML tags, semicolons etc
Is there a list of such characters which is absolutely bad from a web application perspective
I can then use RegEx to blacklist these characters
Background on my application
It is a Java Servlet-JSP based web app.
Tomcat on Linux with MySQL (and sometimes MongoDB) as a backend
What I have tried so far
String regex = "[^<>~##$%;]*";
if(!fname.matches(regex))
throw new InputValidationException("Invalid FirstName")
My question is more on the design than coding ... I am looking for a exhaustive (well to a good degree of exhaustiveness) list of characters that I should blacklist
A better approach is to accept anything anyone wants to enter and then escape any problematic characters in the context where they might cause a problem.
For instance, there's no reason to prohibit people from using <i> in their names (although it might be highly unlikely that it's a legit name), and it only poses a potential problem (XSS) when you are generating HTML for your users. Similarly, disallowing quotes, semi-colons, etc. only make sense in other scenarios (SQL queries, etc.). If the rules are different in different places and you want to sanitize input, then you need all the rules in the same place (what about whitespace? Are you gong to create filenames including the user's first name? If so, maybe you'll have to add that to the blacklist).
Assume that you are going to get it wrong in at least one case: maybe there is something you haven't considered for your first implementation, so you go back and add the new item(s) to your blacklist. You still have users who have already registered with tainted data. So, you can either run through your entire database sanitizing the data (which could take a very very long time), or you can just do what you really have to do anyway: sanitize data as it is being presented for the current medium. That way, you only have to manage the sanitization at the relevant points (no need to protect HTML output from SQL injection attacks) and it will work for all your data, not just data you collect after you implement your blacklist.
Am wondering if the combination of trim(), strip_tags() and addslashes() is enough to filter values of variables from $_GET and $_POST
That depends what kind of validation you are wanting to perform.
Here are some basic examples:
If the data is going to be used in MySQL queries make sure to use mysql_real_escape_query() on the data instead of addslashes().
If it contains file paths be sure to remove the "../" parts and block access to sensitive filename.
If you are going to display the data on a web page, make sure to use htmlspecialchars() on it.
But the most important validation is only accepting the values you are expecting, in other words: only allow numeric values when you are expecting numbers, etc.
Short answer: no.
Long answer: it depends.
Basically you can't say that a certain amount of filtering is or isn't sufficient without considering what you want to do with it. For example, the above will allow through "javascript:dostuff();", which might be OK or it might not if you happen to use one of those GET or POST values in the href attribute of a link.
Likewise you might have a rich text area where users can edit so stripping tags out of that doesn't exactly make sense.
I guess what I'm trying to say is that there is simple set of steps to sanitizing your data such that you can cross it off and say "done". You always have to consider what that data is doing.
It highly depends where you are going to use it for.
If you are going to display things as HTML, make absolutely sure you are properly specifying the encoding (e.g.: UTF-8). As long as you strip all tags, you should be fine.
For use in SQL queries, addslashes is not enough! If you use the mysqli library for example, you want to look at mysql::real_escape_string. For other DB libraries, use the designated escape function!
If you are going to use the string in javascript, addslashes will not be enough.
If you are paranoid about browser bugs, check out the OWASP Reform library
If you use the data in another context than HTML, other escaping techniques apply.
What are the best ways (or at least most common ways) in ASP (VBScript) for input handling? My main concerns are HTML/JavaScript injections & SQL injections. Is there some equivalent to PHP's htmlspecialchars or addslashes, et cetera? Or do I have to do it manually with something like string replace functions?
The bottom line is this:
Always HTML-encode user input before you write it to your page. Server.HTMLEncode() does that for you.
Always use parameterized queries to interface with a database. The ÀDODB.Command and ADODB.CommandParameter objects are the right choice here.
Always use the URLScan utility and IIS lockdown on the IIS server that renders the page, unless they are version 6 and up, which do not require these tools anymore.
If you stick to points 1 and 2 slavishly, I can't think of much that can go wrong.
Most vulnerabilities come from not properly encoding user input or building SQL strings from it. If you for some reason come to the point where HTML-encoding user input stands in your way, you have found a design flaw in your application.
I would add to Tomalaks list one other point.
Avoid using concatenation of field values in SQL code. That is, in some cases a stored procedure may build some SQL in a string to subsequently execute. This is fine unless a textual field value is used as part of its construction.
A command parameter can protect SQL code designed to input a value from being hijacked into executing unwanted SQL but it allows such unwanted SQL to become data in the database. This is a first-level vunerability. A second-level injection vunerability exists if the field's value is then used in some SQL string concatenation inside a stored procedure.
Another consideration is that this is just minimal protection. All its doing is rendering attack attempts harmless. However in many cases it may be better to add to this a system which prevents such data entry altogther and/or alters admins to a potential injection attack.
This is where input validation becomes important. I don't know of any tools that do this for you but a few simple Regular Expressions might help. For example, "<\w+" would detect the attempt to include a HTML tag in the field.