I know simply a LDAP bind can do user password verification. But the thing is that an application server usually uses admin user (cn=Directory Manager) to do all CRUD operations.
By a simple bind operation, we have to create a ldap connection binds with that specific user's dn , which is annoying.
As I know ldapcompare is another alternative, but looks like OpenDJ ldapcompare can not compare plain-text-password(OpenDJ userPassword is encrypted).
But from some ldap browser(Apache LDAP Studio), there's a "Vefiry Password" which works very well.
Any idea ?
Using cn=DirectoryManager from an application server is a security issue, pretty much like running applications as root in the unix world.
Have you tried using the proxyAuth control?
Here are a few relevant links:
https://marginnotes2.wordpress.com/2011/06/28/opendj-proxy-auth/
https://idmdude.com/2015/03/28/opendj-and-the-fine-art-of-impersonation/
Related
We are in the planning phase of configuring our soon-to-be-upgraded databases (19c) to authenticate directly against AD (no oracle proxy). I have read a handful of documents from Oracle on how to do this. Most of the documentation focuses around using passwords (password filter/verifier). The only problem is that our AD administrators are dead-set against implementing Oracle's password filter into our existing AD infrastructure. That being said, one of the security guys said we could implement the oracle authentication using Kerberos instead. From what I have read, and the documents are scattered all over the place, and nothing that detailed, to use Kerberos:
1) The client no longer uses a username/password - they connect using a wallet-style connection (e.g. /#dbname)
2) Not only does the Oracle DB need some configuration changes, but so does every client that plans on using Kerberos
I don't know anything about Kerberos, how it works, and what goes on when you implement this, but I was hoping for, at the end of this is:
1) No client changes/installs (only the oracle DB would have config changes)
The user will continue to provide credentials as before - completely transparent
2) No need for the password filter as our admins have a "beef" against it
So my question is:
If using Kerberos directly against AD on >=18c:
1) Does the client user still provide a username and password to authenticate against AD, or does the client simply get "accepted" due to the tickets/tokens/configuration that occurs on the client (i.e. the client is simply trusted)?
2) Is there client config changes that need to occur, or does the client reach out to the DB and the DB, with its config changes, does all the legwork to authenticate against AD based off of client info being passed
3) Does any additional manual component need to occur on occasion (periodically retrieving a ticket/token/something) (because, say, it expires)
So in the end, we want to have complete transparency with every client and using something other than the password verifier with AD.
Thanks in advance.
-Jim
It sounds like you want to authenticate Windows clients against an Oracle database over a network using Active Directory without making any client changes.
This is pretty open-ended and complex StackOverflow question.
Probably you've been reading the docs about Third Party Network Authentication using Oracle Advanced Security. You can use Kerberos, SSL, RADIUS, PKI, etc. For most of these options, you need to do some setup on the client, because both the Oracle client and server need to authenticate or verify with the third-party system.
I think you need Enterprise User Security (using Oracle Internet Directory). Assuming you go with password-based authentication, you don't need client changes. In this scenario, Oracle Internet Directory can synchronize its user directory with AD, so your users can use their same username/password. However, when they change their AD password, they'll need to change their Oracle password separately.
On a different note, you may be able to alleviate your AD admins' fears about Oracle password complexity requirements, since you can change or remove those to fit your AD requirements.
so I have Windows Server 2012 which is running on my virtual machine. I want to have possibility to make anonymous query against LDAP. For example if I'm using software like Softerra LDAP Browser I need to run this program as domain user to be able browse AD groups/users etc. But my point is that I want to be able to do it also as non-domain user(anonymous), or at least using domain user credentials from machine that is not part of the domain.
I was looking for this option in user/group policies, I've grant my user with all privileges that I found - but always with the same result - I was unable to browse LDAP.
So my question is - what have to bet set/changed to be able make anonymous queries against Windows Server LDAP?
I don't know about anonymous queries, but you said that you would also be happy using a domain user from a non-domain machine.
That should work fine. Create a domain user with sufficient privileges to see what you want.
Install a certificate on your LDAP server (or use Kerberos, but that's more annoying on the non-domain machine).
Then do LDAP authentication using the username and password of that domain user.
It works well.
Since version 5.50 the Bitvise SSH Server allows connected client to authenticate to Windows user account without providing this user's Windows password. See here: https://www.bitvise.com/ssh-server-version-history
I've checked it myself - it does indeed.
My question is of pure curiosity: what kind of sorcery is this? Is there any WinAPI that allows such thing or is this some kind of clever hack? I always thought it is impossible to impersonate as other user without a password (as even when configuring Windows service or scheduled task to "run as user" it is neccessary to provide one).
IIRC, the SSH server in Cygwin does the same thing.
If you have the appropriate privileges you can create an access token with ZwCreateToken, no password required. Such a token has some limitations. For example, you can't access network resources without a password and some encrypted material isn't accessible.
There's an explanation and some sample code here.
Since version 5.50, Bitvise SSH Server comes with a Windows authentication package. An authentication package can enhance the Windows logon process in custom ways. When the SSH server needs to log you in, but does not have a password (e.g. because you logged in with a public key), it calls the authentication package to construct a logon token which closely resembles the logon token that would have been created by Windows. As arx has noted, a session created this way does not contain your authentication credentials, so side effects are that you can't access things like network resources and EFS.
I work as a student web developer for my computer science department and I've been asked to look into a modification of our password reset procedure for linux accounts. Currently users will log in with their university credentials (via Active Directory) and after being authenticated they get a temporary password through email which they are forced to change as soon as they log in. This way eben if the temporary password it intercepted there is a very short time span in which it could even be used.
Now the idea has been posed that instead of using a temporary password that we might allow the user to pick a new permanent password and set it directly through the web utility. It is my understanding that https is more of "the best we have" than "a great way to secure information". Are there any other avenues I can explore for securing the new password so that we can feel comfortable implementing such a system?
Basically, if you communicate with a server over HTTPS and the private key of the server isn't exposed to someone else, you can be sure that anything you transfer (e.g. the new password) can only be decrypted by the server. Additionally the server certificate assures, that the server you are communicating with, really is the server you want to communicate with.
So, using HTTPS provides authentication and prevents eavesdropping.
If you are working with Active Directory, it is my understanding that the Password Modify Extended Operation (which requires the existing password) is not supported. Therefore, the password must be changed with the LDAP modify request. One solution would be to use the UnboundID LDAP SDK with a web application to execute the LDAP modify with the new password. The modify request should be transmitted over a secure connection, or a non-secure connection promoted to a secure connection using the StartTLS extended operation.
see also
AD password change
Using ldapmodify - this article is about the command line utility ldapmodify but the concepts are useful.
What is the best way to send a password to a Windows Service? Our application needs a password in order to start. I don't care that services are "normally" supposed to run without user interaction. Its good enough for us that an operator can start the application and then log off.
On a unix system, I would just echo the password over stdin but the service has no stdin.
Currently, we use the DPAPI to just store the password using CryptProtectData. While this, works, it presents other problems that are beginning to become troublesome.
I'm guessing that I'll need to use some form of IPC between the service and the application that is sending the password but I'm not sure which method is appropriate, if any.
Thanks
Two main options:
You could listen on a socket on startup and wait for the required password to be supplied (maybe embed an SSH server in there, so that the password cannot be snooped over the wire)
My preferred option would be to read the password from a configuration file (that can be secured to the minimum readership) or registry setting (again, sufficiently secure such that only your service and administrators can read/change it)
Thanks for responding Rowland.
You could listen on a socket on
startup and wait for the required
password to be supplied (maybe embed
an SSH server in there, so that the
password cannot be snooped over the
wire)
I considered that but without certificate verification, wouldn't that leave us open to a man in the middle attack?
My preferred option would be to read
the password from a configuration file
(that can be secured to the minimum
readership) or registry setting
(again, sufficiently secure such that
only your service and administrators
can read/change it)
We're trying to follow "defense in depth" as much as possible such that if an attacker compromised the machine, he would not able to access our application.
You can use kerberos mutual authentication. There are few options and examples there.
But just wondering. On a compromised machine, There may be a key logger. So typing the password is never secure if you want to maintain security in this environment. The same problem exist afaik for unix terminals.
DPAPI in UserMode is really the best option, and storing the encrypted data in a protected location, e.g. registry key with limited ACL.
What exactly were the problems that are beginning to be troublesome? Maybe we can just solve those...
What exactly were the problems that
are beginning to be troublesome? Maybe
we can just solve those...
Currently, the application runs as the Local System account.
Our application stores a number of credentials in an encrypted file and uses the DPAPI (in UserMode) for the encryption.
Thus, when the application is installed, the installer is run as the Local System account. We also have a set of tools that ship with the application, some of which need access to this encrypted file and thus, they too need to run as the Local System account.
By the time the application is installed and started, we're heavily dependent on that account.
We're running into problems because one of our users wants to use the application to access a shared network drive. The Local System account has no such privileges and we can't simply run our service as a different user because our encrypted information is protected under the Local System Account.
We've tried to avoid the process of setting up a user account just for our application because it is installed across many different customers and environments, all of whom have wildly different security policies.
You can access a remote drive from a service running under system account. However, you will need to have credentials & share information to connect to the remote machine. You can use the API wnetaddconnection to gain access. Probably your encrypted file can store this credential as well.