if i know key=iv=text, can i crack AES? - bash

Question

The thing is, i want to encrypt some information on my disk.
The method i choose to encrypt my text is:
read pwd
key=${pwd}
iv=${pwd}
encrypt_info = $(echo ${text} | openssl enc -e -A -aes-256-cbc -a -K ${key} -iv ${iv} -nosalt)
But I do not want to enter my password every time I encrypt my information. So i put my "pubkey" somewhere public. The "pubkey" is generated in this way:
read password
pubkey=$(echo ${password} | openssl enc -e -A -aes-256-cbc -a -K ${password} -iv ${password} -nosalt)
I only enter my password every time i want to decrypt my text. Steps to decrypt:
Enter password
Calculate "pubkey" in the way above
If the pubkeys match, the password is the correct one.
Use the correct password to decrypt my information.
You see my steps. My question is, if some one get my "pubkey" and know that the "pubkey" is generated by the way above, can he/she crash my password?

Answer 1

openssl enc -e -A -aes-256-cbc -a -K ${password} -iv ${password} -nosalt)
With aes-256 the key needs to have 32 bytes and iv needs to have 16 bytes, so properly you cannot use the same value (it works for aes-128 though).
You are using the password as a key (-K parameter), so let's use a proper denotation key, which in this case should be 32 bytes hex encoded.
if some one get my "pubkey" and know that the "pubkey" is generated by the way above, can he/she crash my password?
no, that shouldn't be possible
If the pubkeys match, the password is the correct one.
Use the correct password to decrypt my information.
I don't really understand the reason behind the step. You can just try to decrypt the file and if the key is not current, the decryption fails on invalid padding.
Or - do you want to validate the key once when provided by the user? In that case you could validate a hash of the password
echo 'some password' | openssl dgst -sha256
Usually storing a simple hash of a user password is not secure enough, but assuming you provide a random 256 bit key, it should be ok.
iv=${pwd}
This seems to be a vulnerability, the cbc mode needs a random IV to be secure. Reusing the IV for multiple encryptions is not secure.
Maybe just let the openssl generate a random salt (and derive the key and IV from the salt and password) would solve the problem.
echo -n 'some text' | openssl enc -e -A -aes-128-cbc -k 'password' -a